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THE GREAT WRIT AND FEDERAL COURTS:
JUDGE WOOD’S SOLUTION IN SEARCH
OF A PROBLEM
William H. Pryor Jr.*
INTRODUCTION
Judge Diane Wood provides, in her characteristically efficient prose, a
thoughtful overview of the history of the Great Writ in service of a thesis that
her essay otherwise fails to support. Judge Wood invokes Judge Henry
Friendly’s classic article, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal
Judgments,1 to suggest that the writ of habeas corpus should be expanded to
allow federal courts to review the petitions of state prisoners who allege their
actual innocence without otherwise identifying any violation of federal law in
securing their convictions.2 But that thesis cannot be squared with the proposal Judge Friendly championed in his article. Nor is it consistent with the
limited jurisdiction of the federal courts. And Judge Wood’s essay fails to
make the case for how her proposed expansion of the writ would work or
whether it would even likely result in the grant of relief to a substantial number of prisoners whose innocence would otherwise go undetected. If anything, Judge Friendly’s case for restricting the writ remains compelling though
unfulfilled.
I
Judge Wood advocates an expansion of the writ of habeas corpus to
allow federal courts to review the petitions of state prisoners who allege their
actual innocence without otherwise identifying any violation of federal law in
securing their convictions. She argues that a claim of innocence “should
© 2020 William H. Pryor Jr. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce
and distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational
purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the
Notre Dame Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. I thank
three of my law clerks, Elizabeth Kiernan, John Brinkerhoff, and Alex Carver, for their
quick research and writing assistance. All errors are mine.
1 Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U.
CHI. L. REV. 142 (1970).
2 Diane P. Wood, The Enduring Challenges for Habeas Corpus, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1809 (2020).
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stand at the top of the hierarchy of reasons for granting relief,” “well above” a
claim that the state violated one of the procedural rights guaranteed to criminal defendants in the Bill of Rights.3 A “sensible treatment” of the issue, she
maintains, would involve opening the door to a freestanding claim of innocence, but only if the prisoner satisfied “[a] clear and demanding threshold
standard.”4 In her view, “[t]he rule of law itself demands no less.”5
To make her case for expanding the Great Writ to allow freestanding
claims of innocence, Judge Wood relies on an unlikely authority: Judge
Friendly’s classic article advocating a significant restriction of the writ.6 A halfcentury ago, motivated by the “explosion of collateral attack” in federal
courts, Judge Friendly endeavored to chart “the right road for the future.”7
That road involved eliminating collateral review for many claims of constitutional error by convicted prisoners, save for those claims involving a total
breakdown of the criminal process, errors outside the record that cannot be
corrected on appeal, procedures that forbid defendants to raise constitutional claims at trial, and retroactive constitutional rules of criminal procedure.8 Outside of those narrow circumstances, Judge Friendly proposed a
new prerequisite for a prisoner’s federal petition: proof that the prisoner is
innocent of his crime of conviction. As he put it, “convictions should be
subject to collateral attack only when the prisoner supplements his constitutional plea with a colorable claim of innocence.”9
Judge Friendly argued that endlessly revisiting criminal convictions has
many negative consequences and for that reason “carries a serious burden of
justification.”10 It undermines the educational and deterrent functions of
the criminal law, poses great difficulties in accurately determining the facts
long after the commission of the crime, and imposes a tremendous drain on
public resources for vanishingly small rates of error correction.11 The ease
with which prisoners may challenge their convictions also means that “the
occasional meritorious application” is destined “to be buried in a flood of
worthless ones.”12 And society has an interest in the finality and repose that
come with an end to litigating the validity of a criminal judgment.13 In the
light of those costs, Judge Friendly proposed requiring habeas petitioners to
supplement their claims of constitutional error with proof of innocence,
which “would enable courts . . . to screen out rather rapidly a great multitude
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
in the
13

Id. at 1832.
Id.
Id. at 1834.
Id. at 1809–10.
Friendly, supra note 1, at 144, 146.
Id. at 151–54.
Id. at 142.
Id. at 146.
Id. at 146–49.
Id. at 149 (quoting Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 537 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring
result)).
Id.
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of applications not deserving their attention and devote their time to those
few where injustice may have been done.”14
Judge Wood proposes something quite different from what Judge
Friendly had in mind. Judge Wood suggests that freestanding claims of innocence be added to the many existing grounds for collateral relief.15 Judge
Friendly proposed, in contrast, eliminating many existing grounds for collateral relief unless the prisoner could “supplement[ ]” his constitutional claim
with a colorable claim of innocence.16 In short, Judge Wood has turned
Judge Friendly’s proposal on its head.
Judge Wood suggests that it is “unclear” whether Judge Friendly
endorsed a freestanding claim of innocence in collateral review as opposed
to only a “gateway” claim of innocence.17 But Judge Friendly could not have
been clearer that he viewed innocence only as a necessary prerequisite to
habeas relief, not as a basis for relief in its own right. He insisted that a
prisoner “supplement[ ]” his constitutional claim with a showing of innocence, making clear that both elements were required.18 He proposed granting relief only for “the kind of constitutional claim that casts some shadow of a
doubt” on the defendant’s guilt.19 And he explained that there was “no sufficient reason for federal intervention on behalf of a state prisoner who raised
or had an opportunity to raise his constitutional claim in the state courts, in
the absence of a colorable showing of innocence.”20 Apart from a small class
of grievous constitutional violations, Judge Friendly would have required
proof of both a violation of federal law in securing a prisoner’s conviction
and actual innocence as prerequisites for habeas relief.
Judge Friendly’s article asked whether innocence was irrelevant, not
whether constitutional error was irrelevant.21 Indeed, Judge Friendly’s goal
of “halting the inundation” of federal-habeas petitions makes sense only if we
understand his proposal for proof of innocence as serving a gatekeeping
function.22 As Judge Wood acknowledges, creating a freestanding claim of
innocence would increase the risk “that hordes of prisoners would raise frivolous claims of innocence, and that the courts would drown” in the flood of
petitions—the very problem Judge Friendly sought to remedy.23

14 Id. at 150.
15 Wood, supra note 2, at 1832.
16 Friendly, supra note 1, at 142.
17 Wood, supra note 2, at 1834.
18 Friendly, supra note 1, at 142.
19 Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 242 (1969)
(Black, J., dissenting)).
20 Id. at 167 (emphasis added).
21 Id. at 172.
22 Id. at 157.
23 Wood, supra note 2, at 1832.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\95-5\NDL502.txt

1838

unknown

Seq: 4

notre dame law review

10-JUN-20

14:54

[vol. 95:5

II
Judge Wood’s proposal is also in deep tension with the limited jurisdiction of federal courts. Although her core premise is that actual innocence
“[s]urely . . . should stand at the top of the hierarchy of reasons for granting
relief, even at such a late stage as a collateral petition,”24 she never explains
how federal courts possess that authority. As courts of limited jurisdiction,
federal courts possess only the power that arises from the Constitution and
federal statute.25 And neither the Constitution nor federal law empowers the
federal courts with the right to grant writs of habeas corpus on the basis of
innocence alone.
Support for a right to habeas relief because of actual innocence cannot
be found in the Constitution itself. Although the Constitution secures a right
to habeas corpus through the Suspension Clause,26 Judge Friendly explained
that “the writ protected by the suspension clause is the writ as known to the
framers.”27 And as he explained, a “fundamental principle[ ]” of habeas
corpus at the founding was that “once a person had been convicted by a
superior court of general jurisdiction, a court seized of a habeas petition
could not go behind the conviction for any purpose other than to verify the
jurisdiction of the convicting court.”28 In other words, the “general rule” was
that “a conviction and sentence by a court of competent jurisdiction is lawful
cause of imprisonment, and no relief can be given by habeas corpus.”29 Unsurprisingly, then, the writ provided in the Judiciary Act of 1789 did not benefit
“persons Convict or in Execution.”30 It cannot be said that imprisoning a
factually innocent person after a full and fair trial violates the Constitution
when the Suspension Clause was originally understood to not afford habeas
relief to prisoners convicted by a lawful process in a court with competent
jurisdiction.
Nor can the authority for a freestanding claim of innocence be found in
any federal statute. Although Congress has long empowered federal courts
to grant habeas relief after a state court has convicted a prisoner, federal law
allows relief only on “the ground that [a petitioner] is in custody in violation
of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”31 So imprison24 Id.
25 See, e.g., Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994); see
also Turner v. Bank of N. Am., 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 8, 11 (1799) (“A Circuit Court, however, is of
limited jurisdiction; and has cognizance, not of cases generally, but only of a few specially
circumstanced, amounting to a small proportion of the cases, which an unlimited jurisdiction would embrace.”).
26 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2; see also INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 300–01 (2001).
27 Friendly, supra note 1, at 170.
28 Id. at 171 n.147.
29 Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 375 (1880).
30 Habeas Corpus Act 1679, 31 Car. 2 c. 2 (Eng.); see Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14,
1 Stat. 73, 82; Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 101 (1869) (“As limited by the act of
1789, [the writ] did not extend to cases of imprisonment after conviction, under sentences
of competent tribunals . . . .”).
31 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2018).
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ing an innocent person after a full and fair trial would justify habeas relief
only if the judgment of conviction and sentence violated federal law.32
Although Judge Wood describes “convicting one who is actually innocent” as a “foundational error,”33 she admits that the Supreme Court has not
so ruled. As she acknowledges,34 the Supreme Court has only “assume[d],
for the sake of argument,” that executing an innocent defendant after a full
and fair trial would be unconstitutional.35 But this assumption is a shaky
foundation on which to rest a broader federal right. Not only has the
Supreme Court never held that executing an innocent person violates the
Constitution, it has never even suggested that imprisoning an innocent person
after a full and fair trial would do so. Indeed, for over a century, the
Supreme Court has distinguished a petitioner’s guilt or innocence from
whether a constitutional violation led to his punishment.36
Perhaps recognizing the dearth of support for actual-innocence challenges to imprisonment, Judge Wood suggests that Congress could “tweak”
existing law to allow for her proposal.37 But she skips over another necessary
premise to her position: that Congress enjoys the power to do so. Needless to
say, creating a new federal claim for habeas relief based on innocence alone
would be controversial.38 Congress, of course, cannot create new constitutional rights where none exist.39 And Judge Wood does not otherwise
32 See NANCY J. KING & JOSEPH L. HOFFMANN, HABEAS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
97 (2011) (“[T]he habeas remedy does not create the federal rights it vindicates. The
federal guarantees upon which habeas petitioners must rely to challenge their state convictions and obtain relief from the federal courts must be established independently by
Supreme Court decisions interpreting and applying the Constitution.”).
33 Wood, supra note 2, at 1823.
34 Id. at 1830.
35 Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417 (1993); see also In re Davis, 557 U.S. 952, 955
(2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting); House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 554–55 (2006).
36 See, e.g., Herrera, 506 U.S. at 400 (“[F]ederal habeas courts sit to ensure that individuals are not imprisoned in violation of the Constitution—not to correct errors of fact.”);
Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 317 (1963) (“[T]he existence merely of newly discovered
evidence relevant to the guilt of a state prisoner is not a ground for relief on federal habeas
corpus.”); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 87–88 (1923) (“[W]hat we have to deal with [on
habeas review] is not the petitioners’ innocence or guilt but solely the question whether
their constitutional rights have been preserved.”); Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 305 (1888)
(“As the writ of habeas corpus does not perform the office of a writ of error or an appeal,
[the facts establishing guilt] cannot be re-examined or reviewed in this collateral
proceeding.”).
37 Wood, supra note 2, at 1833.
38 See KING & HOFFMANN, supra note 32, at 97 (“[G]iven the limited constitutional
authority provided to Congress in the area of criminal justice, it is doubtful that any federal
habeas statute could manufacture a new federal right, cognizable in habeas, on behalf of
state prisoners who claim to be factually innocent.”); cf. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S.
619, 635 (1993) (“The States possess primary authority for defining and enforcing the
criminal law. . . . Federal intrusions into state criminal trials frustrate both the States’ sovereign power to punish offenders and their good-faith attempts to honor constitutional
rights.” (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128 (1982)).
39 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 529 (1997).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\95-5\NDL502.txt

1840

unknown

Seq: 6

notre dame law review

10-JUN-20

14:54

[vol. 95:5

explain how Congress, through its enumerated powers, has the authority to
legislate on this subject.
III
Judge Wood makes a bold proposal: that federal courts or Congress
should depart from years of practice and precedent to provide state prisoners
whose convictions were obtained by fair processes another opportunity to
establish their innocence in federal courts. But she neither explains how this
new claim would work in practice nor makes the case that this new claim
would provide relief to a substantial number of prisoners. Of course, Judge
Wood’s proposal has normative appeal: no one wants to see an innocent person convicted. Fortunately, existing processes already guard against that
result, and Judge Wood does little to explain why more guards are necessary.
Judge Wood does not address the single most important aspect of an
actual-innocence claim—the remedy. What remedy should be afforded to a
state prisoner with a successful claim of actual innocence? Several Justices
posed that question in Herrera,40 but Judge Wood provides no answer. Her
answer likely depends on which standard courts adopt to evaluate these
claims, another question about which she avoids expressing an opinion.41
But these questions must be answered before Judge Wood’s solution can be
accepted.
Judge Wood also fails to make a persuasive case that a substantial number of state prisoners would even benefit from being allowed to raise a claim
of actual innocence. In short, she offers no proof that providing state prisoners a habeas remedy for actual innocence would solve a real problem. To be
sure, Judge Wood references 2471 “exonerations” since 1989, the low presidential-pardon rate, and the short statute of limitations to bring a federalhabeas claim.42 But none of those facts support the need for a freestanding
claim of actual innocence.
Take the 2471 “exonerations.” Not all of these so-called “exonerations”
involve “actual innocence.”43 Although I did not explore all of these cases, a
quick review reveals some convictions that were vacated because a court ruled
that the prisoner had ineffective assistance of counsel. That is, the court did
not pass on the guilt or innocence of the prisoner but concluded only that
40 See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 403 (“The dissent fails to articulate the relief that would be
available if petitioner were to meet[ ] its ‘probable innocence’ standard. Would it be commutation of petitioner’s death sentence, new trial, or unconditional release from
imprisonment?”).
41 Wood, supra note 2, at 1832–33 (identifying three possible standards for evaluating
claims of actual innocence).
42 Id. at 1820, 1827–28.
43 Judge Wood cites to the New England Innocence Project for this statistic, see id. at
1820, which in turn relies on the National Registry of Exonerations, see Causes of Wrongful
Convictions, NEW ENG. INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.newenglandinnocence.org/causesof-wrongful-convictions (last visited Mar. 18, 2020). So, I reviewed that registry.
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the prisoner’s counsel was deficient in some respect—a classic problem of
fair process.
For example, one alleged exoneration involved a defendant accused of
“molesting one of his female students more than [sixty] times.”44 The girl
testified at his first trial that the defendant “fondled her at virtually all of her
lessons.”45 After trial, the defendant obtained new counsel who argued that
his trial counsel failed to present an adequate defense by not offering character witnesses or securing a psychological evaluation.46 The state court
granted a new trial for those reasons.47 The district attorney then dismissed
the charge only because the victim refused to testify again.48 Indeed, the
defense attorney admitted that the dismissal did not establish his client’s
innocence.49
In another contested case, a defendant was convicted of raping an eightyear-old girl.50 Over twenty years later, the girl recanted, but medical evidence and other witnesses contradicted her recantation.51 Although the
state chose not to retry him after a new trial was ordered, a judge denied him
state compensation because he had not satisfied his “burden of proving
actual innocence.”52
Another of the alleged “exonerations” illustrates the difficulty of evaluating the evidence decades later. A federal district court granted the writ to a
state prisoner after finding that the prisoner carried his burden to overcome
procedural default by establishing actual innocence and his burden to prove
a constitutional error by establishing a Brady53 violation.54 The Fifth Circuit
affirmed the grant of relief over a sharp dissent.55 And the state, adamantly
maintaining its belief in the defendant’s guilt, then dropped the charges only
because “of missing witnesses and the loss of crucial evidence.”56 The district
44 Maurice Possley, Boping Chen, NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS (Sept. 7, 2012), http:/
/www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3991.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 See Dave Boyce, Piano Teacher Walks After Judge Dismisses Retrial, ALMANAC (Nov. 2,
2009), https://www.almanacnews.com/news/2009/11/02/piano-teacher-walks-afterjudge-dismisses-retrial-.
50 Maurice Possley, Andrew Taylor, NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS (Feb. 2, 2017),
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=5080.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
54 See Floyd v. Vannoy, 894 F.3d 143, 148 (5th Cir. 2018) (per curiam); Ken
Otterbourg, John Floyd, NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS (Dec. 3, 2018), http://
www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=5454.
55 See Floyd, 894 F.3d at 168–73 (Smith, J., dissenting).
56 Matt Sledge, John Floyd, Once a Lifer at Angola, to Have Murder Case Dropped, Orleans
DA Says, NEW ORLEANS ADVOC. (Nov. 20, 2018), https://www.nola.com/article_8322f0224ccb-5323-bc61-045d5b57b000.html; see also In re Allen, 366 S.W.3d 696, 708 (Tex. 2012)
(observing that the prosecutor only dismissed the charges because of “the destruction . . .
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attorney expressed frustration that a federal court “ha[d] replaced the finding of the experienced [state] judge who was the finder of fact when the
evidence was freshest, and who was in the courtroom 35 years ago to personally evaluate the credibility of the defendant’s concocted alibi.”57
My quick review of the data on which Judge Wood relies also uncovered
that many of the “exonerated” prisoners received relief from state courts, not
federal courts. Again, I did not review all 2471 cases, but from my experience
you could blindly throw a dart at this list and odds are you would hit a state
prisoner whose conviction was vacated through state processes.58 My experience is unsurprising when you take into account that less than one percent of
all noncapital federal-habeas petitions filed by state prisoners are granted
each year.59 That so many “exonerated” state prisoners receive relief from
state courts suggests that state courts are already doing a fine job at ferreting
of all physical evidence, the death of one fact witness, the failing memory of another fact
witness, and the effect of the passage of time . . . on the memory of other fact witnesses and
the health of yet other surviving witnesses”); Maurice Possley, Billy Frederick Allen, NAT’L
REGISTRY EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/case
detail.aspx?caseid=3884 (last updated June 27, 2016).
57 Heather Nolan, Orleans DA Moves to Vacate 1982 Murder Conviction, Dismiss Case
Against John Floyd, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Nov. 20, 2018), https://www.nola.com/news/
crime_police/article_dcee04d8-6614-5f1e-8e23-47e11034d222.html; see also Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 391 (1993) (“[T]he passage of time only diminishes the reliability of
criminal adjudications.”); McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 491 (1991) (“[W]hen a habeas
petitioner succeeds in obtaining a new trial, the ‘“erosion of memory” and “dispersion of
witnesses” that occur with the passage of time’ . . . diminish the chances of a reliable criminal adjudication.” (quoting Kuhlman v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 453 (1986))); Friendly, supra
note 1, at 147 (“The longer the delay, the less the reliability of the determination of any
factual issue giving rise to the attack. . . . Moreover, although successful attack usually
entitles the prisoner only to a retrial, a long delay makes this a matter of theory only.”).
58 See, e.g., Ctr. on Wrongful Convictions, Corey Eason, NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS,
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3197 (last
visited Mar. 7, 2020) (Illinois county court vacated conviction); Possley, supra note 56
(Texas state court vacated conviction and ordered new trial); Maurice Possley, Craig Armstrong, NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS (Sept. 22, 2019), http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=5612 (Illinois Appellate Court vacated
conviction); Maurice Possley, Darrell Wayne Bivens, Jr., NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS (Apr.
15, 2013), http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?
caseid=4146 (Texas District Attorney’s office requested that the state court vacate conviction because it concluded, only one month after Bivens pled guilty, that a mistake had
been made); Maurice Possley, Dennis Davis, NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS (June 19,
2019), http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=
5585 (Texas state courts vacated conviction); Maurice Possley, Margaret Earle, NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS (Feb. 23, 2014), http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/
Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=4381 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court vacated conviction); Maurice Possley, Wilbert Jones, Nat’l Registry Exonerations (Oct. 13, 2018), http://
www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=5392 (Louisiana
state courts vacated conviction).
59 KING & HOFFMAN, supra note 32, at 79, 81 (estimating that “fewer than sixty of the
more than seventeen thousand habeas cases filed each year in the federal courts will result
in the order of a retrial, resentencing, new opportunity for appeal, or release”).
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out those “actually innocent” prisoners. This general statistic does little to
support an argument that the existing processes for evaluating claims of
actual innocence are insufficient.
Judge Wood also cites the “grim” statistics on presidential clemency as
evidence that clemency provides an insufficient avenue of relief for innocent
state prisoners.60 But the President can grant clemency only to federal prisoners.61 The President has no power to pardon state prisoners.62 So the
“grim” presidential pardon statistics are of no concern to federal collateral
review of state convictions.63
Fortunately, the statistics for state clemency are not as “grim.” For example, sixteen states “frequent[ly] and “regular[ly]” grant pardons, which
means these states have “a regular pardon process with a high percentage of
applications granted (30% or more).”64 Indeed, Alabama and Georgia ordinarily grant more than 500 pardons annually.65 Connecticut too grants over
500 pardons annually.66 And three of the top five states with prisoners currently sentenced to death are among the sixteen states that “frequently and
regularly” grant pardons.67 That many states have a robust clemency program undermines the need for the creation of a freestanding federal claim of
innocence.68
In addition to clemency, many states also afford other protections to
guard against the continued imprisonment of innocent prisoners. For example, all states have enacted statutes that allow postconviction DNA testing in
60 Wood, supra note 2, at 1828.
61 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (“The President . . . shall have Power to grant Reprieves
and Pardons for Offenses against the United States . . . .” (emphasis added)).
62 See id.
63 See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 414–16 (1993) (explaining that states have long
made clemency available to its prisoners and observing that clemency has played a significant role in securing the release of factually innocent persons).
64 Margaret Colgate Love, 50-State Comparison: Pardon Policy & Practice, COLLATERAL
CONSEQUENCES RESOURCES CTR., https://ccresourcecenter.org/state-restoration-profiles/
50-state-comparisoncharacteristics-of-pardon-authorities-2/ (last updated Mar. 2020).
65 Id.
66 Board of Pardons and Parole Statistical Information, ST. CONN. BOARD PARDONS &
PAROLES, https://portal.ct.gov/BOPP/Research-and-Development-Division/Statistics/Statistics (last visited Apr. 5, 2020).
67 TRACY L. SNELL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 2017: SELECTED FINDINGS 2 (2019), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cp17sf.pdf (identifying California,
Florida, Texas, Alabama, and Pennsylvania as the top five states with prisoners under death
sentences); Love, supra note 64 (classifying Alabama, California, and Pennsylvania as frequent and regular); see also Ex parte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202, 204–05 (Tex. Crim. App.
1996) (en banc) (confirming that state prisoners can raise freestanding claims of actual
innocence “as an independent ground for relief” in postconviction proceedings).
68 See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 415 (“Executive clemency has provided the ‘fail safe’ in our
criminal justice system.” (quoting KATHLEEN DEAN MOORE, PARDONS: JUSTICE, MERCY, AND
THE PUBLIC INTEREST 131 (1989))).
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certain circumstances.69 “[A]ll states have enacted statutes which allow for
motions for new trials based on newly discovered evidence,” and some allow
for newly discovered evidence to “serve as grounds for post-conviction
relief.”70 Some states have even begun allowing prisoners to raise freestanding claims of actual innocence on collateral review.71 These additional safeguards again suggest that few, if any, state prisoners would even benefit from
the creation of a new federal claim of innocence.72
Finally, Judge Wood’s concern that evidence of a state prisoner’s actual
innocence may not be easily obtainable and can “take[ ] much longer than
the one-year period given by the statute” does not support the need for a
freestanding claim of innocence.73 The Supreme Court and Congress have
already addressed this issue. As Judge Wood acknowledges,74 the Supreme
Court allows a petitioner to overcome the limitations bar so long as he proves
that he “pursu[ed] his rights diligently” and that “some extraordinary circumstance” prevented timely filing.75 “[A] credible showing of actual innocence” also suffices to overcome the limitations bar.76 Similarly, the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act permits the filing of a second
or successive petition where “the factual predicate for the claim could not
have been discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence” and
those facts “establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant
guilty.”77 Judge Wood does not explain why these mechanisms are insufficient to protect a prisoner who belatedly uncovers new evidence.
69 See John M. Leventhal, A Survey of Federal and State Courts’ Approaches to a Constitutional Right of Actual Innocence: Is There a Need for a State Constitutional Right in New York in the
Aftermath of CPL § 440.10(G-1)?, 76 ALB. L. REV. 1453, 1474–77 (2013).
70 Id. at 1472–74.
71 Id. at 1477–81.
72 See KING & HOFFMAN, supra note 32, at 88–89 (observing that since the rapid expansion of federal habeas relief for state prisoners in the 1960s, “states have adopted and
implemented modern appellate and postconviction remedies” that are “available and routinely used to review federal constitutional claims [and that] . . . [the] particular crisis in
the balance of power between federal law and state governments no longer exists”); id. at
86 (“The institutional and structural reforms of state judicial review have long since
occurred, and convicted defendants generally now have access to state appellate and postconviction review processes . . . [so] habeas litigation in state noncapital cases today . . . is
an appalling waste of resources . . . .”); see also William J. Brennan, Jr., Federal Habeas Corpus
and State Prisoners: An Exercise in Federalism, 7 UTAH L. REV. 423, 441 (1961) (explaining that
federal habeas review of state court convictions “would become unnecessary” once states
implemented appellate and postconviction procedures that redressed constitutional
violations).
73 Wood, supra note 2, at 1827.
74 Id. at 1828–29.
75 Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010) (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S.
408, 418 (2005)).
76 McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 392 (2013).
77 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, § 106(b), 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(b)(2)(B) (2018).
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Judge Wood proposes that the federal courts and Congress deviate from
the original purpose of the Great Writ and many years of practice. Before
adopting such a significant change, we should expect there to be evidence of
a significant problem. But Judge Wood offers no such evidence. If anything,
Judge Friendly’s case for restricting collateral review for convicted prisoners
remains compelling but unfulfilled.
Judge Friendly suggested that the “proverbial man from Mars” would be
shocked to learn that “the one thing almost never suggested on collateral
attack is that the prisoner was innocent of the crime.”78 And Judge Wood
offers no evidence that claims of innocence in collateral review are increasing. If the 7500 applications for postconviction relief filed the year before
Judge Friendly wrote his article were beyond an “inundation,” “what is the
right word for” the more than 22,000 applications filed last year?79 Like most
federal-habeas petitions filed by state prisoners, Judge Wood’s proposal
should be denied.

78
79

Friendly, supra note 1, at 145.
Id. at 144; Table C-2—U.S. District Courts—Civil Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics, U.S.
COURTS (Mar. 31, 2019), https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/c-2/federal-judicialcaseload-statistics/2019/03/31.
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